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Abstract. Since the inception of the modern income tax, the
investment tax credit and depreciation have been some of the
most modified provisions. This paper traces the history of
major changes in depreciation and the investment tax credit
along with the tax policy justifications given at the time the
changes were made. In addition, the influence of tax depreciation on financial reporting is also discussed. An historical
perspective of these two major provisions in tax should be
helpful to policymakers and researchers attempting to assess
the effectiveness of these policies.

INTRODUCTION
All machinery is on an irresistible march to the
junk heap, and its progress, while it may be
delayed, cannot be prevented by repairs.
This
obvious economic fact is of momentous import to
accounting, although full recognition has not
been given to it in general practice... It implies
that, in valuing all fixed assets, account must be
taken of the lapse of time, and even in the case of
machinery giving no evidence either of use or misuse, the bare fact that it is a year nearer its
inevitable goal is an item of which technical
account must be taken [Hatfield, 1927, p. 130].
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A depreciation deduction has been a part of modern U.S.
income tax since its inception. It is at the nexus of several tax policy objectives that at times compete against and at other times
complement one another. Since its debut with the corporate
excise tax in 1909, the law regarding depreciation has been
amended at least once in every decade. The tax policy motivations for these changes are attributed to any of the following:
proper income measurement, raising revenue, encouraging capital formation, or ensuring a neutral tax system. Since so many tax
policy goals can be ostensibly served by the deduction, it is not
surprising that the law has changed so many times during the
20th century.
An historical perspective on the role of depreciation would
not be complete without including a discussion of a related provision, the investment tax credit (ITC). The primary purpose of ITC
is to spur capital formation. When capital formation is an important tax policy goal, there are often changes to depreciation, ITC,
or both. The potential for depreciation and ITC to alter capital formation has drawn the attention of a wide variety of academicians.
Despite years of study, the results from empirical research are far
from conclusive.1 Notwithstanding the lack of conclusive evidence about their effectiveness, tax policymakers have used
depreciation and ITC as a means to alter investment spending.
The purpose of this paper is to document the changes in depreciation and ITC, the tax policy motivations behind these changes,
and the context for the changes that have occurred since the modern U.S. income tax began. By understanding the context for past
legislation, both researchers and policymakers can better understand past, current, and potential changes.
The history of the role of depreciation in the income tax can
be defined into five time periods: 1909-1953, 1954-1961, 19621980, 1981-1985, and 1986 to the present. The legislation of 1954,
1962, 1981, and 1986 represented major shifts with regard to tax
policy and its relationship to depreciation or ITC. The discussion
below documents the changes and the tax policy motivations for
each change that occurred during each time period. In addition,
economic and other relevant factors are also addressed.

1
See Chirinko [1986, 1993] for critical analyses of empirical research related
to investment spending.
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THE EARLY YEARS: 1909-1953
An allowance for depreciation has been included as a deduction for determining taxable income since the inception of modern corporate and individual income taxes. 2 The corporate excise
tax enacted as part of the Tariff Act of 1909 permitted "a reasonable allowance for depreciation of property, if any." The Revenue
Act of 1913 permitted "a reasonable allowance for exhaustion,
wear and tear of property arising out of its use in a business." The
early rationale for the depreciation deduction is contained in the
Bureau of Internal Revenue's Regulation 74, Article 202 in which
it posited that the necessity for a depreciation deduction arises
from the fact that certain business property is subject to exhaustion. Depreciation's role was primarily that of income determination. With its inclusion of depreciation in the income tax base,
the government was actually taking a bold step that differed from
much of financial reporting practice of the day.3 In commenting
about financial reporting practice in the early part of the 20th
century, Hatfield [1927, p. 140] offered the following summary:
Present practice unfortunately does not always
correspond to current principle. Corporations
are still apt to look upon the charge for depreciation as being an act of grace rather than of necessity, and the allowance is frequently less in the lean
than in the prosperous years. But the improvement since . . . 1908 has been very marked. At that
time any recognition of depreciation was relatively u n c o m m o n in the accounts of American corporations, and the relatively few companies that
showed depreciation in prosperous years grew

2
The U.S. first enacted an income tax in 1861 to fund the Civil War. This tax
did not m e n t i o n d e p r e c i a t i o n . D e p r e c i a t i o n w a s specifically e x c l u d e d as a
deduction for the 1894 income tax which was ruled unconstitutional. Thus, a
depreciation deduction was not provided for in the calculation of taxable income
prior to 1909. The corporation excise tax enacted in 1909 was a tax on corporate
income. The inception of the modern-day individual income tax began with the
ratification of the 16th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution on February 25, 1913,
and the passage of the Revenue Act of 1913 on March 1, 1913.
3
Grant and Norton [1949, p. 249] noted that, "it is significant that the first
recognition of annual expense of depreciation for tax purposes occurred in the
same year in which depreciation was first recognized by the Supreme Court
[Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Company, 212 U.S. 1 (1909)] as an element in the
regulation of public utility rates."

Published by eGrove, 2000
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faint-hearted when business was poor. But an
examination of the balance sheets during the trying period after the Great War shows that many of
them made charges for depreciation even though
that resulted in a net deficit. This closer adherence to correct accounting principles was doubtless stimulated by the provisions of the income-tax
law.
Saliers [ 1923] offered a similar summary, noting that firms refused
to allow for depreciation expense early in the 20th century. In his
view, corporations in 1922 were still varying their depreciation
deductions with their earnings. By 1932, Paton [1932, p. 578]
noted:
Depreciation accounting has by no means attained
an ideal state, but there is now almost universal
agreement as to the general significance of depreciation and the importance of recognizing the
phenomenon in some appropriate manner. The
cost of plant assets which have a limited useful life
must evidently be taken into consideration, in
some other way if not in the form of systematic
accruals, if costs of production are to be accurately calculated, periodic income determined on a
sound basis, and the integrity of investment maintained. The income tax regulations have no doubt
been more potent in bringing about this condition
than the admonitions of accountants or the arguments of academicians.
Thus, it appears that early efforts to define taxable income by
including depreciation had an impact on financial reporting practice in the early part of the 20th century. Apparently, however,
financial managers exercised a considerable degree of discretion
with regard to the amount of depreciation, if any, that was
expensed on their income statements for financial reporting. For
the first third of the 20th century, they also had a great degree of
latitude with regard to how much depreciation they deducted for
income tax purposes.
In 1920, the Treasury first issued Bulletin F, leaving the determination of the amount of depreciation to the taxpayer based on
his judgment and experience, with final approval by the

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol27/iss2/7
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Commissioner. Thus, taxpayers had a considerable degree of freedom in determining their depreciation deductions. During the
1924-1931 time period, depreciation allowances increased substantially.
By 1931, claimed depreciation deductions exceeded corporate
taxable income [U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Ways and
Means, 1934]. In 1931, the Treasury issued a revised Bulletin F. It
attached a preliminary study that gave "probable useful lives" for
over 2,700 different kinds of industrial assets. Determining a
depreciation deduction remained at the taxpayer's discretion,
however. The deduction would not be disallowed unless the government could demonstrate "by clear and convincing evidence"
that the deduction was "unreasonable." By 1934, the House Ways
and Means Committee considered substantial across-the-board 25
percent reductions in depreciation allowances for the 1934 to
1936 time period. It estimated that the government would receive
an additional $85 million in tax revenue per year from the recommended changes.
The Treasury Department, however, opposed an arbitrary
reduction. It believed that the matter could best be resolved by
administrative rather than legislative action. Treasury Secretary
Morgenthau proposed that the Treasury require taxpayers to furnish supporting schedules, require depreciation to be limited to
an asset's useful life, and switch the burden of proof for a reasonable deduction to the taxpayer. Rather than mandating depreciation deductions through legislation, the choice was made to handle it administratively through guidelines drafted by the Treasury.
In 1934, the Treasury Department issued Treasury Decision
4422, 1934 CB 58 (TD 4422). TD 4422 outlined the Treasury's
change in policy as Secretary Morgenthau had proposed. TD 4422
required taxpayers to furnish a schedule showing their calculation
of depreciation e x p e n s e to substantiate their d e d u c t i o n s .
Taxpayers were allowed to allocate the cost of an asset over its useful life using the straight-line or units-of-production method.
Until 1934, the burden of proof fell on the Internal Revenue examiner to demonstrate that a taxpayer had misstated income by
improperly calculating his depreciation expense by clear and convincing evidence. This policy was changed in 1934, shifting the
b u r d e n of proof from the government to the taxpayer.
In 1942, the Treasury Department issued a second revision of
Bulletin F. Bulletin F recommended useful lives for over 5,000
assets. The Treasury's estimates of useful lives, however, were
Published by eGrove, 2000
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based on surveys conducted during the Great Depression of the
1930s w h e n businesses tended to replace their obsolete assets less
frequently. Thus, the useful life estimates listed in Bulletin F's revision w e r e generally longer than an asset's actual useful life and
longer than in the 1931 version of Bulletin F. This disparity resulted in tax depreciation deductions being less than what was considered economic depreciation. This policy continued until 1954.
During this time a taxpayer could also use the "facts and circumstances" method, whereby assets were assigned useful lives
based on the taxpayer or industry's general experience. However,
if the taxpayer chose to define an asset's depreciable life using
Bulletin F rather than the "facts and circumstances" method, he
avoided controversy in an audit. Thus, many assets were depreciated using either the straight-line or units-of-production method
over the assets' useful lives as defined in Bulletin F. It was not until
1954 that the tax laws were revised to bring tax depreciation
more in line with what was considered economic depreciation.
A SHIFT IN TAX POLICY PERSPECTIVE: 1954-1961
Until 1954, Congress viewed depreciation solely as a deduction necessary for proper income determination. The deduction
was an allowance which reflected the "exhaustion, wear and tear
of property used in a trade or business" [IRC §167(a)]. The
enactment of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, however,
marked a major shift in depreciation's role in tax policy. For the
first time Congress considered using tax depreciation as an economic incentive for stimulating investment. It also marked the
first time Congress, rather than the Treasury, decided the allowable means for calculating the deduction.
The tax law change in 1954 allowed businesses to use any
method of depreciation as long as it was both consistently applied
and did not exceed twice the straight-line rate of depreciation.
Congress believed that the pre-1954 depreciation system acted as
a barrier to investment. It also believed that the pre-1954 "tax
depreciation methods might depress business capital expenditures below the level needed to keep the economy operating at
high levels of output and employment" [U.S. Congress, House,
Committee on Ways and Means, 1954, p. 22]. Thus, the 1954 tax
changes were designed to provide incentives for investment.
At the same time, however, Congress was also concerned
about the effect these changes would have on income determination. The n e w methods of depreciation would:
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol27/iss2/7
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...concentrate deductions in the early years of service and [would result] in a timing of allowances
more in accord with the actual pattern of loss of
economic usefulness. With the rate limited to
twice the corresponding straight-line rate and
based on a realistic estimate of useful life, the proposed system [would conform] to sound accounting principles [U.S. Congress, House, Committee
on Ways and Means, 1954, p. 23].
Thus, Congress wanted to stimulate investment while remaining
within economic and accounting principles. With the 1954 law,
Congress sanctioned the use of the double-declining balance
method. This was the first time Congress opted to decide what
depreciation methods should be allowed. Up until this time,
depreciation was handled administratively through the Treasury
Department.
In 1958, the Small Business Tax Revision Act of 1958 introduced first-year depreciation for the first time. This allowed small
businesses to deduct up to 20% of the cost of tangible personal
property. 4 The purpose of this provision was to assist small business by increasing the amount of funds available to them via a
reduction in tax liability [Congressional Record, 1958, pp. 17,085,
17,090]. A variation of this election, known as the immediate
expense election, remains today 5
THE 1960s AND THE INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT
Investment Tax Credit Enacted (1962): The Revenue Act of 1962
(RA62) represents a landmark in terms of tax incentives for investment. ITC was first introduced in RA62.6 President Kennedy
advocated enacting the credit to stimulate capital formation. He
believed higher levels of capital formation would raise productivity, keep people employed, and alleviate a serious balance of pay-

4

T h e maximum eligible cost was $10,000 for unmarried taxpayers ($20,000
for married taxpayers) for a maximum deduction of $2,000 and $4,000 respectively.
5
T h e deduction is no longer a percentage of allowable cost, but is an election
to deduct the full cost of property up to $20,000 in the year 2000 (increasing to
$25,000 for the years 2003 and thereafter).
6
A credit, as opposed to a deduction, is a dollar for dollar reduction of a taxpayer's tax liability. The first ITC was 7% of the cost of personalty in the year of
Published
by eGrove, 2000
acquisition.
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ments problem [U.S. Congress, House, 1961, p. 3]. Congress
echoed his sentiments by stating that the objective of the credit
was "to encourage modernization and expansion of the Nation's
productive facilities and thereby improve the economic potential
of the country, with resultant increase in job opportunities and
betterment of our competitive position in the world economy"
[U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance, 1962, p. 11].
Stimulating investment was to be accomplished through two
major tax revisions. These were the Treasury's revision of depreciation guidelines and ITC. Congress believed that realistic depreciation rules did not provide sufficient incentive to spur economic growth. An additional incentive in the form of an ITC would
stimulate investment in two ways. First, it would reduce the net
cost of acquiring depreciable assets. Second, it would increase the
cash flow available for investment 7 [U.S. Congress, Senate,
Committee on Finance, 1962, p. 11].
Congress also considered the possibility of using more accelerated methods of depreciation in lieu of a credit. This idea was
discarded, however. Congress believed the credit was "preferable
to higher depreciation charges because the latter tends to distort
income accounting" [U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on
Finance, 1962, p. 12]. It seems clear that Congress did not wish to
deviate materially from accounting and economic concepts of
income in order to stimulate investment.
ITC Suspension (1966-1967): In 1966, the U.S. faced problems
with inflation. Therefore, President Johnson initiated a comprehensive plan which called for reducing government expenditures
for low-priority programs and temporarily suspending tax incentives for investment [U.S. Congress, House, 1966, pp. 4-7].
Congress noted that the bill was:
...part of an overall program designed to moderate
the pace of the economy to a level more compatible with the rate of increase in our physical capacity to produce, to begin the return to price stability and to relieve distortions among various sectors
of the economy which arise from widely different

7

The reasoning behind this argument is that a firm would have a pool of available funds for investment. The 7% credit for new investment would augment this
pool so that more investment could be made.

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol27/iss2/7
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rates of growth. By removing certain tax incentives for investment in machinery, equipment and
buildings, the bill will ease inflationary pressures
in those sectors w h e r e demands for output are
straining present productive capacity The action
also will have the effect of reducing pressures
tending to raise interest rates and will promote an
increased flow of credit into the home mortgage
market. Moreover, the bill can be expected to produce a short-run improvement in the Nation's balance-of-payments position as demand for output is
brought into balance with the existing capacity to
p r o d u c e the o u t p u t [U.S. Congress, Senate,
Committee on Finance, 1966, p. 4].
Thus, ITC and accelerated depreciation on real property were
temporarily suspended from October 10, 1966 to December 31,
1967.
The suspension ended up being short-lived. On June 13, 1967,
President Johnson signed H.R. 6950 [P.L. 90-26], lifting the suspension effective March 10, 1967. At the time ITC was reinstated,
interest rates were dropping and housing starts were up. It
appeared as if the economy was rebounding and the suspension
no longer necessary
ITC Abolished (1969-1971):
In 1969, problems with inflation
reappeared. Once again, Congress believed that ITC directly contributed to inflationary pressures and wide fluctuations in investment. Eliminating the credit would help reduce inflation and help
keep the rate of change in investment on a more steady path [U.S.
Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means, 1969, p. 178].
Although Congress considered suspending the credit as it had
done a few years earlier, the idea was rejected on two grounds.
First and foremost, Congress believed that during the prior suspension period (1966-1967), businesses had simply postponed
their acquisitions until after the suspension was lifted. In the
view of Congress, it was "undesirable to repeat that experience"
[U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means, 1969, p.
179]. Second, suspension and subsequent restoration of the credit were administratively difficult.
Therefore, Congress voted to repeal ITC. At the time the credit was repealed, Congress had no plans for bringing it back any
time in by
theeGrove,
future.2000
In fact, it believed that:
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...It [might] well be that the normal incentives of
potentially greater profits in the context of a stable growth, full employment economy will provide the investment needed without resorting to
special devices to stimulate investment which, on
occasion, appear to give rise to investment booms
[U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Ways and
Means, 1969, p. 180].
DEPRECIATION FROM THE EARLY 1960s TO
THE REVENUE ACT OF 1971
Revenue Procedure 62-21: Although the depreciation rules did
not change as frequently during the 1960s as those associated
with ITC, depreciation did not escape controversy. In 1962, the
next major change with regard to depreciation occurred. That
year the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued Revenue Procedure
62-21, 1962-2 CB 418 (Revenue Procedure 62-21). Bulletin F had
defined useful lives on an asset-by-asset basis. Revenue Procedure
62-21 took a different approach by grouping assets by industry of
use. The guideline lives were based on statistical data and assessm e n t of technological trends for each industry in the U.S.
[Revenue Procedure 62-21, p. 463]. The n e w guideline lives
placed a greater emphasis on the economic life of an asset rather
than its physical life [Revenue Procedure 62-21, p. 464]. As a
result, write-off periods for assets could be reduced 30 to 40%. A
taxpayer could only use the n e w guideline lives, however, if they
were consistent with the actual retirements and replacement
practices of his business. This could be demonstrated by a reserve
ratio test. 8
The reserve ratio test was used to form ranges of depreciable
lives based on a taxpayer's actual usage. Taxpayers could only continue to use the g e n e r o u s guideline lives u n d e r Revenue
Procedure 62-21 if they conformed to actual service lives as determined by the reserve ratio test. This test effectively obligated taxpayers to retire property within the guideline life periods in order
to continue to use guideline lives.
Although the IRS initially expected that the guideline lives

8

The reserve ratio was calculated by dividing accumulated depreciation by the
gross (undepreciated) basis of an asset within a class. This ratio was then used to
form a range for depreciable lives no greater than 20% or no less than 10% of a
benchmark life based on actual usage of the firm's assets.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol27/iss2/7
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under Revenue Procedure 62-21 [p. 464] would alleviate controversy, implementation of the reserve ratio test proved controversial. Announcement 71-76, 1971-2 CB 503 (Announcement 71-76)
criticized the reserve ratio test on the basis that one could not
determine if guideline lives had been violated until an asset was
disposed [Announcement 71-76, pp. 503, 511]. In addition, a survey indicated that 87% of IRS agents found the test unworkable
and impractical [Announcement 71-76, p. 512]. The reserve ratio
test was abandoned with the enactment of the Revenue Act of
1971.
Along with the controversy surrounding the IRS's implementation of Revenue Procedure 62-21 during the 1960s, Congress
also made a few innovations to tax law associated with depreciation. With the Revenue Act of 1962, Section 1245 depreciation
recapture was introduced for the first time. This provision converts the character of a gain from the sale of personalty that is
attributable to prior depreciation into ordinary income. Congress
wished to prevent using depreciation to convert ordinary income
into capital gains [U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance,
1962]. The Revenue Act of 1964 extended depreciation recapture
to buildings with Section 1250 recapture, subsequently made
more stringent with the Tax Reform Act of 1969.
The Revenue Act of 1971: In the early 1970s, the U.S. faced high
unemployment, inflation, and little growth in GNP and investment. The business tax incentives that were enacted in 1971 were
designed to be "large enough to stimulate the economy and yet
not so large that they [would] create a n e w wave of inflationary
pressure" [U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance, 1971, p.
7]. The major business tax incentives were a revision of the
depreciation rules and a reinstatement of ITC.
The Revenue Act of 1971 introduced the Class Life Asset
Depreciation Range System (ADR). ADR provided n e w guidelines
for defining an asset's useful life. These guidelines effectively
replaced the Revenue Procedure 62-21 guidelines that had been
used until that time. Like Revenue Procedure 62-21, an asset's useful life was defined by its industry of use rather than by type of
asset.9 The number of asset classes, however, was increased from
75 to 132.
9
TheTreasury Department was given authority to prescribe depreciable lives
based on anticipated industry norms [U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Ways
and Means,by
1971].
Published
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ADR provided an additional feature not present in Revenue
Procedure 62-21. Taxpayers were able to select an asset's useful
life from a range of lives. The range was 20% less than to 20%
greater than those provided by Revenue Procedure 62-21. The
Revenue Act of 1971 still allowed taxpayers to define useful lives
using the "facts and circumstances" method. Congress expected,
however, that the ranges of lives provided by ADR would make
administering the depreciation rules simpler. They believed that
ADR would reduce the n u m b e r of disputes which were likely to
arise because of the particular facts and circumstances of the taxpayer's situation [U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance,
1971, p. 48].
ITC also reappeared under the guise of a jobs development
investment credit. 10 The credit was reinstated for several reasons.
First, the credit was expected to improve the economy by creating
additional jobs through increased expenditures in machinery and
equipment. Second, Congress expected the credit to reduce
inflation this time because "an increased flow of goods into the
market is the best long run assurance w e can have of keeping
prices down." Third, n e w investment in productive facilities
would help make them more efficient. Therefore, the U.S. would
be more competitive in foreign markets and the balance of payments would be improved [U.S. Congress, House, Committee on
Ways and Means, 1971, pp. 5-6].
TAX REDUCTION ACT OF 1975
In 1975, the U.S. faced its highest levels of unemployment
since 1941. The Tax Reduction Act of 1975 was designed to
restore economic growth and to move toward full employment. A
key component of the Act was a temporary increase in ITC.
The Tax Reduction Act of 1975 increased ITC from 7% to 10%
for qualified property acquired before January 1, 1977. Congress
expected the tax revisions "would help revive the economy and
increase employment without adding significantly to inflationary
pressures." Once again, Congress believed that the increase in the
tax credit would create more jobs, increase productivity, reduce
inflation, and improve the U.S. balance of p a y m e n t s [U.S.
Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means, 1975, p p . 7-11].
10
The form of the "jobs development investment credit" was similar to ITC that
was abolished in 1969. It allowed a credit of 7% of the cost of personalty in the year
of acquisition.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol27/iss2/7
12

ation and the investment tax credit in tax policy and their influence on financial reporting du
Kern: Depreciation and the Investment Tax Credit

157

The Tax Reform Act of 1976 extended the "temporary"
increase in ITC until December 31, 1980. The Revenue Act of 1978
made the "temporary" increase permanent, effective January 1,
1981.
THE BEGINNING OF THE
ACCELERATED COST RECOVERY SYSTEM (ACRS): 1981-1985
ACRS: The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA) represents
a major turning point in the evolution of depreciation and tax policy with the first appearance of the Accelerated Cost Recovery
System (ACRS). Until ERTA, Congress was concerned that tax
depreciation rules conformed to sound accounting and economic
principles. Under ERTA, this function of the depreciation deduction no longer seemed important. In fact, ACRS was so different
from what accountants and economists typically referred to as
depreciation that the deductions were called "cost recovery"
instead of depreciation. With ERTA, simplifying tax rules and
encouraging investment seemed far more important than conforming to accounting practice for financial r e p o r t i n g .
Under ACRS, personalty was categorized into one of four
"recovery classes." Assets were grouped according to the n u m b e r
of years over which their original cost was recovered. Of the four
personalty recovery classes, only the three-year and five-year classes were frequently used. The ten-year and fifteen-year classes
were reserved for a relatively few specialized assets. Under ERTA,
all depreciable realty had a 15-year recovery period.
There were several reasons for enacting ACRS. First, Congress
concluded that prior depreciation and ITC provisions required
revisions because they did not provide the investment stimulus
that was considered essential for economic expansion. Second,
Congress believed that the prior law was unnecessarily complicated. Third, the real value of depreciation deductions had
declined because of inflation. It was hoped that ACRS would
compensate for this problem by giving assets shorter lives [Staff of
the Joint Committee on Taxation, 1981, p. 73]. A fourth reason
mentioned in several hearings was to help the U.S.'s balance of
payments problem by increasing the nation's competitiveness in
international trade via increased productivity from investment in
more modern equipment. In addition to major revisions in depreciation, ERTA modified ITC making it more compatible with
ACRS.
Published by eGrove, 2000
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Post-ERTA Modifications: 1982 to 1985: During the four years following ERTA, a series of three different pieces of legislation gradually rolled back some of ERTA's generosity. First, the Tax Equity
and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA) required either a
reduction in depreciable basis or a reduced ITC.11 In addition,
when ERTA was originally enacted, more accelerated cost recovery schedules were planned to begin in 1985 and 1986.12 TEFRA
repealed the planned accelerations in depreciation deductions.
Second, the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 lengthened the recovery period for realty from 15 to 18 years. In addition, special limitations for passenger cars were enacted.13 Finally, the Imputed
Interest Act of 1985 further lengthened the realty recovery period
from 18 to 19 years.
All three pieces of legislation were enacted during a time
when cutting federal budget deficits was a primary concern [U.S.
Congress, House, 1982; U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on
Finance, 1985]. The modifications in TEFRA were based on a concern that the combined effect of ITC and the accelerated depreciation in ACRS had been too generous [U.S. Congress, Senate,
Committee on Finance, 1982, p. 126]. In 1984, Congress was concerned that real-estate depreciation had led to excessive tax shel11

TEFRA required a taxpayer to reduce the depreciable basis of property by
one-half of ITC taken. Taxpayers could elect to depreciate the full depreciable
basis of property if they reduced ITC taken. Under this election, property eligible
for the 10% ITC only received an 8% credit. Property eligible for a 6% ITC received
a 4% credit.
l2
The ACRS schedules, as enacted in 1981, were developed to approximate
150% declining balance in the early years of an asset's life with a switch to straightline for later recovery years. Under ERTA, the schedules were to change in 1985 to
approximate 175% declining balance in the early years of an asset's life with a
switch to sum-of-the-years' digits for later years. In 1986, the schedules were to
change once more reflecting the use of 200% declining balance with a switch to
sum-of-the-years' digits.
13
T h e Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 limited ACRS deductions to $4,000 for the
first year and $6,000 each year thereafter for passenger automobiles. In addition,
ITC was limited to $1,000 ($667 if the taxpayer elected to reduce ITC to be able to
depreciate the full cost of the asset rather than reducing the depreciable basis by
one-half of ITC). Congress believed that ITC and ACRS should be used to stimulate
capital formation rather than to subsidize what it perceived to be "the element of
personal consumption associated with the use of very expensive automobiles''
[U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means, 1984, p. 1387]. In addition,
there was a perception that taxpayers tended to overstate the proportion of business use of automobiles. It was Congress' belief that the ACRS and ITC limits
would assist with compliance in this regard [U.S. Congress, House, Committee on
Ways and Means, 1984, p. 1387].
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol27/iss2/7
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ters to the detriment of more productive investments [U.S.
Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance, 1984]. When ERTA was
enacted in 1981, the role of depreciation in income measurement
was not a concern. By 1985, this concern had resurfaced w h e n the
Senate Finance Committee felt that "the useful life of most real
property exceeds 18 years and that an increase in the cost recovery period for real property would more correctly measure the
income from real property" [U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on
Finance, 1985, p. 15].
1986 TO PRESENT
Tax Reform Act of 1986: The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) is
the final major shift in depreciation and tax policy. TRA86
repealed ITC and made additional modifications to ACRS, resulting in MACRS. Cultivating investment as a policy goal was not
abandoned, but the means of doing so w e r e considerably
changed.
TRA86 was enacted to increase the fairness, efficiency, and
simplicity of the tax system [Staff of the Joint Committee on
Taxation, 1986, p. 6]. Congress wished to reduce the role taxes
play in investment and consumption decisions. Rather than targeting specific forms of investment, Congress believed that the
"surest way of encouraging the efficient allocation of all resources
and the greatest possible economic growth was by reducing statutory tax rates" [Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, 1986, p.
98].
TRA86 repealed ITC. As opposed to the 1969 repeal, the current repeal has been far more long-lived as ITC has not reappeared. See Table 1 for a summary of ITC changes. Congress
believed that ITC "discriminated against long-lived investment and
was used as a tax shelter device" [Staff of the Joint Committee on
Taxation, 1986, p. 10]. Instead of targeting investment for a
defined set of assets, capital formation incentives under TRA86
were provided by lower tax rates and accelerated depreciation.
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TABLE 1
Changes in the Investment Tax Credit and Rationale for Change
Legislation

Change

Congressional Rationale

Revenue Act of 1962

Investment tax credit enacted

Stimulate capital formation

H.R. 17607 [Public Law 89-800]

Investment tax credit suspended
effective 10/10/66 to 12/31/67

Ease inflation and relieve
distortions across sectors in
the economy

H.R. 6950 [Public Law 90-26]

Investment tax credit
suspension lifted effective
3/10/67

Economic pressure appeared
to have lifted

Tax Reform Act of 1969

Investment tax credit repealed

Ease inflationary pressures

Revenue Act of 1971

Investment tax credit reinstated

Creating jobs

Tax Reduction Act of 1975

Temporary increase in the
investment tax credit from
7% to 10%

Revive economy and
increase employment

Tax Reform Act of 1976

Temporary increase extended
to 12/31/80

Stimulating investment

Revenue Act of 1978

Temporary increase made
permanent effective 1/1/81

Stimulating investment

Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982

Reduction in depreciable basis
or reduced credit

Combined effect of ACRS and
investment tax credit was
perceived to be too generous

Tax Reform Act of 1986

Investment tax credit repealed

Enhance neutrality of tax system by
repealing a provision that discriminated against investment in longer-lived
assets

In addition to repealing ITC, Congress modified ACRS. MACRS
was designed to "provide for more neutral depreciation treatment
across diverse assets" [Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation,
1986, p. 10]. Congress once again returned to the notion that
recovery periods should more closely reflect the actual useful
lives of assets.
Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993: The Revenue Reconciliation
Act of 1993 was enacted during a time w h e n reducing budget
deficits was a primary goal. In it, Congress lengthened the nonresidential realty recovery period from 31.5 to 39 years. With this
legislation, Congress turned full circle toward having depreciation
reflect "proper" income measurement with regard to depreciable
real property. It felt that depreciation deductions had been larger
than the actual decline in the value of property. In order to
measure more accurately the economic income derived from
using nonresidential realty, the recovery period was increased to
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol27/iss2/7
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39 years [U.S. Congress, House, Budget Committee, 1993, pp. 625626]. With this change the recovery period for buildings returned
to an amount close to what it was prior to ERTA. With the use of
component depreciation14 and the facts and circumstances methods of depreciation, depreciable lives for buildings was effectively 36 to 37 years [Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, 1981,
p. 20]. The changes in the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 are
the most recent changes in depreciation. See Table 2 for a summary of depreciation changes over time.
TABLE 2
Changes in Depreciation and Rationale for Changes
Legislation or Administrative
Action

Change

Congressional Rationale

Corporate Excise Tax Act of 1909

Depreciation first appeared

Revenue Act of 1913

Depreciation appeared as part of
the first income tax under the
16th Amendment

Bulletin F first issued (1920)

Determination of depreciation
expense remained taxpayer
determined

(Administrative action)

Bulletin F first revised (1931)

Determination of depreciation
expense remained taxpayer
determined but an attachment
provided examples of useful lives
for over 2,700 different assets

(Administrative action)

TD 4422 (1934)

Required taxpayers to furnish a
schedule supporting their
depreciation deduction; limited
depreciation to an asset's useful life;
shifted the burden of proof to the
taxpayer to demonstrate that
depreciation was properly
determined

(Administrative action)

Bulletin F 2nd revision (1942)

Treasury Department recommended
useful lives for over 5,000 assets
based on studies conducted during
the Depression

(Administrative action)

Internal Revenue Code of 1954

Congress allowed businesses to use
any depreciation method as long as
it did not exceed twice the straightline rate

Stimulate investment while
remaining within accepted
economic and accounting
principles

Small Business Tax Revision Act
of 1958

Immediate expense election
first introduced

Assistance to small businesses

Revenue Procedure 62-21

Provided guideline lives based on
an industry-by-industry basis rather
than an asset-by-asset basis

(Administrative action)

Revenue Act of 1962

Section 1245 recapture introduced
for the first time

Raising revenue (recapture
provisions designed conversion of
ordinary income to capital gains)

"Component depreciation allowed a taxpayer to depreciate the parts of a
building over differing useful lives rather than depreciating the entire over a uniform life.
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TABLE 2 (cont.)

Legislation or Administrative
Action

Change

Congressional Rationale

Revenue Act of 1964

Recapture (Section 1250) extended
to buildings

Raising revenue (recapture provisions
designed conversion of ordinary
income to capital gains)

Tax Reform Act of 1969

Section 1250 recapture tightened

Revenue raising

Revenue Act of 1971

Class Life Asset Depreciation Range
System introduced (ADR)

Encourage investment

Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 Accelerated Cost Recovery System
(ACRS) introduced

Investment stimulus, simplifying
law, and compensating for inflation
effects

Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility
Act of 1982

Depreciable basis reduced if
full investment tax credit taken

Perception that 1981 provisions
were too generous

Deficit Reduction Act of 1984

Real property lives extended from
15 to 18 years

Deficit reduction

Imputed Interest Act of 1985

Real property lives extended from
18 to 19 years

Deficit reduction and bringing useful
lives for realty closer to actual useful
lives

Tax Reform Act of 1986

Modified ACRS introduced
extending recovery periods for
personalty and realty (residential
realty lives extended to 27.5 years
and nonresidential extended
to 31.5 years)

Enhance neutrality in tax system

Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993

Extended recovery period for
nonresidential realty to 39 years

Better measurement of economicincome

CONCLUDING REMARKS
In the 90 years since the inception of the modern income tax,
tax policy and depreciation have come nearly full circle. Until
1954, depreciation's role was primarily one of proper income
determination. In 1954, Congress first entertained the notion that
depreciation could be used to further other tax policy goals,
specifically encouraging capital formation. From 1954 to 1981,
income measurement and economic motivations were the primary tax policy considerations. The investment credit, initially
enacted in 1962, was turned off and on during this period, justified entirely on economic grounds. ERTA's enactment in 1981
marked a major turning point in depreciation policy. For the first
time, the role of depreciation in income determination was
ignored. Encouraging investment and simplifying the tax rules
were the primary motivations behind the law. Soon after ERTAs
enactment, revenue-raising concerns became important and
Congress began to lengthen depreciable lives over a series of legislative acts. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 abandoned the notion of
targeting investment in certain types of assets. The neutrality of
the tax system became important. ITC was repealed, and ACRS
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol27/iss2/7
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was modified based on neutrality considerations. By the Revenue
Reconciliation Act of 1993, Congress had come full circle with the
desire to have better income measurement. Encouraging certain
forms of investment was no longer paramount.
Despite Congressional use of depreciation and ITC to further
economic goals, the empirical evidence about the effectiveness of
these tax policy tools is quite mixed. There is no consensus about
the effectiveness of these measures. Since depreciation is based
on w h e n an asset is placed in service, taxpayers are left with a
hodgepodge of regulations as a complex legacy of Congressional
policymaking. For the time being, the current rules for n e w acquisitions are relatively simple and have returned to useful lives that
are closer to what they were before ERTA's enactment. History
indicates, however, that as economic pressures change, depreciation and ITC are particularly vulnerable to modifications. Each
change adds another layer of complexity for taxpayers. The
impact of taxes on investment has been, and is, clearly an important issue that warrants further study to assist policymakers in
shaping the law.
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